Information Operations
We track Iranian state media ecosystems, IRGC-linked information networks, and coordinated inauthentic behavior. Our work documents the actors, narratives, and platforms used to shape opinion inside and outside the country.
We document the Iranian state’s information apparatus: the official outlets, the unofficial proxies, the coordinated networks operating across Telegram, X, and platforms with significant Persian-language audiences. The aperture is wide: state media coordination, IRGC-aligned channels, networks targeting diaspora communities, and influence operations directed at foreign publics during specific events.
Iranian information operations sit inside a broader system of state activity that connects directly to cyber operations, sanctions evasion, and the network conditions we cover in adjacent focus areas. A campaign that uses fake personas to amplify a narrative often shares infrastructure with cyber actors. A messaging push that coincides with a sanctions decision tells us something about state priorities. We treat the influence pillar as one face of a system, and our work in this domain is informed by what we see across the others.
Our published research and dossiers in this area have informed coverage at major international media outlets and supported government investigations into Iranian information operations. The work is cited regularly by peer research organizations and used by analysts working on platform integrity, election security, and foreign interference.
Five sub-areas inside the influence pillar.
State Media Ecosystems
IRIB and its constellation of broadcast and digital outlets. Tasnim, Fars, Mehr, ISNA, and the smaller channels that surface state messaging in different registers for different audiences. Editorial coordination patterns observed across them.
IRGC-Linked Networks
Channels and accounts operating with apparent IRGC direction or alignment. Personnel, organizational relationships, and the patterns that connect ostensibly independent voices to coordinated direction. Observable behavior over time.
Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior
Networks of fake or repurposed accounts amplifying state-aligned narratives during specific event windows. Cross-platform coordination, timing patterns, and the operational signatures that distinguish coordinated activity from organic discourse.
Diaspora and Dissident Targeting
Influence operations directed at Iranian diaspora communities, journalists in exile, and dissident voices. Harassment campaigns, impersonation networks, and the tactics used to fragment and discredit critics of the state.
Narrative Analysis
The arguments Iranian state messaging makes during specific moments: military operations, sanctions actions, internal protests, regional conflicts. What the state wants its publics to think, and how the framing shifts as conditions change.
Our work in influence operations draws on Persian-language source networks, our internal directory of Iranian state-aligned actors and channels, and the operational visibility we maintain into Iranian network conditions.
Most analysis of Iranian information operations is produced by generalist platform-integrity teams or by researchers focused on a single platform, often without Persian-language capability. We work in Persian as a primary research language and monitor closed channels that most Western firms cannot reach. We connect what we see in influence operations to what we observe in cyber, sanctions, and network infrastructure, rather than treating each platform as a separate incident. This is the single most important factor separating depth from surface in this domain.
Read our full approach →Recent work in information operations.
Published research in this domain is forthcoming.
See all Digital Impact Lab work →The influence pillar sits alongside three other domains of Iranian state activity online.
Cyber Operations
Iranian state-aligned threat actors, their infrastructure, and their operations against targets inside and outside the country.
Sanctions & Procurement
Front companies, financial evasion, beneficial ownership structures, and the procurement networks that sustain sanctioned activity.
Network Infrastructure
Iranian internet architecture, censorship and surveillance systems, connectivity patterns, and the AI-driven analysis we use to monitor conditions on Iranian networks at scale.